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COMMENT
THE REPERCUSSIONS OF WEINGARTEN: AN
EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
AT INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEWS
The National Labor Relations Act (Act) declares that a
goal of national labor policy is that workers be provided with
"full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
S.. mutual aid or protection." To this end the Act was struc-
tured to eradicate the "inequality of bargaining power be-
tween employees ... and employers." 1
In NLRB v. Weingarten,2 the Supreme Court held that an
employee has the right to be represented at an interview with
management which he or she reasonably believes may result
in the imposition of discipline. The Court found this right
necessary to achieve a balance of power between employee
and employer at investigatory interviews.3 There has been ex-
tensive post-Weingarten litigation regarding the right of rep-
resentation. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) and
the courts of appeals have attempted to follow the guidelines
established by the Weingarten Court.
Discussion of the representation right in its present form
and its future development must consider the interests of the
employer, the employee and the union. The Board and courts
have been successful in this task in the majority of cases. The
principles outlined by Weingarten have been followed gener-
ally. New guidelines must now be established for issues not
addressed in Weingarten.
I. PRE-Weingarten DEVELOPMENTS
A. Early Developments
The Board, in Ross Gear and Tool Co.,4 first acknowledged
the right to union representation of an employee at an investi-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
2. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
3. Id. at 262.
4. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012, 19 L.R.R.M. 2190 (1945). The Ross Gear case did not supply
clear precedent in the area of employee representation since the employee involved
was also a member of a union committee, and had been called to the meeting as a
union representative. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain if the Board's analysis was
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gatory meeting. The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's order, finding that such a policy would encourage
employee insubordination. 5 In Dobbs Houses, Inc.,8 the Board
rejected the existence of a representation right by summarily
affirming a trial examiner's decision which found no authority
in the Act for an employee's right to union representation at a
disciplinary meeting. These early Board decisions did not pro-
vide any clear rationale or statutory basis for a representation
right.
Texaco, Inc.,7 provided a statutory basis, albeit temporary,
for the representation right. The Board found that a denial of
representation at a disciplinary interview would violate sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act,8 which provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees . . . ." The
employer was found to be obligated to bargain with the union
representative because of the union's status as an exclusive
representative. Since the purpose of the meeting was to pro-
vide a record for support of disciplinary action, the meeting
was deemed to involve the "conditions of employment." To
deal directly with an employee regarding "conditions of em-
ployment" would violate the union's rights as an exclusive
bargaining representative under section 9(a) of the Act.9 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement, 10 finding
the meeting to be merely investigatory and not one where an
employer sought to deal with its employees regarding condi-
tions of employment."'
A line of cases followed Texaco, Inc. which stressed the
based on the employee's individual rights.
5. 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947). The Seventh Circuit also pointed out that a griev-
ance was not yet present and, as such, employee representation rights had not yet
matured.
6. 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 55 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1964).
7. 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). This section provides, in part, that union bargaining
agents shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in the unit regarding
conditions of employment.
10. 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 145. While denying enforcement, the court did not criticize the statu-
tory analysis used by the Board.
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distinction between disciplinary meetings and investigatory
meetings. 12 Representation rights would exist if the meeting
were for disciplinary reasons, but no representation would be
permitted if the meeting were merely investigatory or fact-
finding in nature.13 However, this investigatory/disciplinary
dichotomy was not found to be useful in resolving representa-
tion conflicts.' It became increasingly difficult for the Board
and courts to clearly distinguish between an investigatory
meeting and a disciplinary meeting.
B. A New Statutory Analysis
In 1972, a new statutory formulation based on section 715
of the Act was utilized by the Board in addressing the repre-
sentation issue.16 Section 7 protects employees' rights to en-
gage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.''1" The new stat-
utory analysis used by the Board focused on the rights of the
individual employee rather than on the bargaining rights of
the union as an exclusive representative. When an employee
requested representation, the Board viewed the employee as
attempting to band together with other employees for mutual
protection of their employment status.
The Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits denied enforce-
ment of these decisions, rejecting the section 7 and 8(a)(1)
analyses. The courts disagreed with the Board on the exis-
tence of a statutory basis for the right to representation at the
investigatory stage.' 8 The employer's prerogative to hold in-
12. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693
(1971); Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834, 78 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1971);
Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 68 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968).
13. 194 N.L.R.B. at 492-93, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1694-95.
14. Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 331,
332 (1973-74).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
16. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972); Weingarten,
Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 82 L.R.R.M. 1559 (1973); Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052,
80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
18. See NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Wein-
garten, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th
Cir. 1973). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits did not find adequate explanations for the
1980]
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vestigatory interviews without interference was found to be
superior to any right the employee might have in
representation. 19
II. Weingarten
A. Acceptance of the Section 7 Analysis
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the
Board and the courts in Weingarten" and IL WGU v. Quality
Manufacturing Co.21 In six-to-three decisions, the Court up-
held the Board's statutory analysis.22 The Court adopted the
Board's conclusion that denial of a request for union repre-
sentation at an investigatory interview which the employee
reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1)
and an interference with section 7 employee rights.2
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found the
Board's reasoning to be proper. The Court initially noted that
the "Board's holding is a permissible construction of 'con-
certed activities for . ..mutual aid or protection .. " 24
While it may be the employee alone who may have an imme-
diate interest in the interview's outcome, his request to be
represented is action that involves mutual "aid and protec-
tion" of other workers. The representative is not only protect-
ing the "particular employee's interest, but also the interests
of the entire bargaining unit, by exercising vigilance to make
certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a prac-
tice of imposing punishment unjustly."2 "The representa-
tive's presence is an assurance to other employees in the bar-
gaining unit that they, too, can obtain aid and protection if
called upon to attend a like interview. '2 The Board's analysis
was found to clearly further the Act's goal of creating protec-
new statutory formulations. The Seventh Circuit stated that "economic activities"
were intended to be covered by section 7 and not representation rights.
19. NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1025 (4th Cir. 1973).
20. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
21. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
22. 420 U.S. at 260.
23. Id. at 256.
24. Id. at 260.
25. Id. at 260-61.
26. Id. at 261.
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tions for employees in the exercise of their rights of associa-
tion and mutual protection. Permitting access to representa-
tion at investigatory interviews would be one way in which
employees could band together to achieve a balance of power
between employees and employer at an investigatory
meeting.2 7
The Court also found the recognition of the right useful to
both the employer and employee. Discussing the advantages
which representation would provide to the employer, the
Court pointed out that the presence of a representative would
discourage the filing of grievances where the employer's action
appeared justified. Moreover, the Court noted the assistance
that a representative could provide in the clarification of facts
and issues. 28
Finally, the Court found that the right becomes effective
at the appropriate pre-grievance stage because "it becomes in-
creasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself
M..29 at the grievance stage, and the "value of representa-
tion is correspondingly diminished . . ."30 at the grievance
stage. Once an employer decided to discipline an employee, it
would be more difficult to arrive at a compromise. Instead, the
employer may develop an interest in vindicating his discipli-
nary decision. These policy considerations moved the Court to
find an adequate basis for a right to representation.
B. Parameter and Limits of the Representation Right
The right to representation is defined by five principles
discussed in Weingarten. The principles can be summarized
as follows:
1. That the right springs from section 7's protection of
the employee's conduct in concert for mutual aid and
protection.
2. That the "right arises only in situations where the em-
ployee requests representation."
3. That the employee's right to request representation is
only present when the employee reasonably believes that
27. Id. at 262.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 264.
1980]
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the investigation will result in disciplinary action.
4. That the exercise of the right may not interfere with
legitimate employer prerogatives. The employer is not re-
quired to justify his refusal to allow representation and he
may proceed with-the investigation by gathering informa-
tion from other sources.
5. That the employer is not required to bargain with the
representative who attends the interview."
In the companion case of Quality Manufacturing Co., 2
the Court reaffirmed its holding in Weingarten and further
concluded that the discipline or threat of discipline of an em-
ployee because he or she refused to participate in an interview
for which representation was requested but not afforded was
an unfair labor practice.3
The dissent in Weingarten rejected the statutory analysis
of the Board, and concluded that an interview in which an
employee reasonably fears a disciplinary result is not within
the scope of protected concerted activity.3 4 Furthermore, the
dissent stated that the power to discipline employees was an
employer prerogative of such stature that it could be curtailed
only by "specific limitation[s] imposed by statute or through
• ..collective bargaining.""
III. THE AFTERMATH OF Weingarten
The Board and the courts of appeals have struggled since
Weingarten to implement the outline proposed by the Court.
Litigation regarding the right to representation of employees
in investigatory interviews has been abundant. The following
sections trace the roads followed by the Board and the courts
of appeals in the representative area.
A. Disciplinary/Investigatory Dichotomy
The Supreme Court in Weingarten dealt directly with the
31. Id. at 256-60.
32. 420 U.S. 276, 280.
33. Id. at 276, 280.
34. 420 U.S. at 270-72. In a separate dissent, Chief Justice Burger found the new
interpretaion of section 7 to be such a radical development from past Board interpre-
tations that he would remand to have the Board further explain its reasoning.
35. Id. at 273-74.
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availability of representation in investigatory interviews.36 In
the process, the Court recognized the existence of a right to
representation in disciplinary interviews.3 7 In pre-Weingarten
cases, the rule appeared to be that if an investigatory inter-
view were involved, no representation right applied; if a disci-
plinary interview were involved, a representation right did ap-
ply.38 After Weingarten, it appeared that when an employee
was summoned to an interview which the employee reasona-
bly believed could result in discipline, the right to representa-
tion applied.
The apparent shift from the discipline/investigation di-
chotomy has not been consistently followed by the Board or
courts. A problem arises when the employer calls a meeting
which the employee reasonably believes will result in disci-
pline, but which has as its purpose to merely announce a dis-
ciplinary decision which has been previously made. In Mt.
Vernon Tanker Co.,39 the Board found a section 8(a)(1) viola-
tion in a refusal to provide representation at a meeting called
by a ship's captain to enter a log (a type of maritime disci-
pline) against a crew member. The decision to discipline had
been made prior to the meeting. The court of appeals denied
enforcement, 40 pointing out that since "logging ... occurs af-
ter that question has been settled . . ., [t]he result from the
outset is a foregone conclusion."4 In as much as no investiga-
tion or questioning of the employees had occurred, no right to
representation was found. In Certified Grocers of California
Ltd., 2 the Board again found that the right of representation
extends to meetings which only involve the announcement of
a predetermined punishment. The Board held that requiring
the sole employee to attend the meeting would "perpetuate
36. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
37. Id. at 260.
38. Note, Employee Right to Union Representation During Employer Interroga-
tion, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 298, 305-08 (1975-76).
39. 218 N.L.R.B. 1423, 89 L.R.R.M. 1793 (1975).
40. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977).
41. Id. at 575. This case was also decided on the principle that maritime situa-
tions were not appropriate for representation rights. Rather than seeking to balance
the power between employer and employee, maritime law would maintain and further
the imbalance in labor relations.
42. 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 94 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1977).
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the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate. '43 Again the
court of appeals denied enforcement." The court emphasized
that the purpose of the meeting was not to "elicit damaging
facts from [the employee] . .. 2 5 The court found Wein-
garten to be the exclusive basis for representation at investi-
gatory interviews.
The Board has apparently decided to follow the position of
the courts. In Baton Rouge Water Works,4" the Board stated
that "an employee has no section 7 right to the presence of his
representative at a meeting. . . held solely for the purpose of
informing the employee of, and acting upon a previously made
disciplinary decision. '47 The Board found that not all discipli-
nary interviews fall under this rule, only those strictly-limited
in function and action.
Member Murphy, concurring in Baton Rouge, distin-
guished interviews (which involve the gathering of informa-
tion) from disciplinary actions. "Disciplinary action" does not
involve an interview; it merely consists of an announcement of
a previously made disciplinary decision. Under the analysis
presented by Member Murphy, the crucial question is not
whether the interview is investigatory or disciplinary, but
rather, whether there was an interview at all. This approach
avoids the difficult exercise of distinguishing between investi-
gatory and disciplinary interviews. The employer would be
limited to one function, that being the announcement of a
previously made disciplinary decision.
A strong dissent was filed by Member Penello, who, upon
tracing pre-Weingarten developments, concluded that a right
to representation at disciplinary meetings, where a decision
regarding discipline had been previously made, existed before
Weingarten. The representation right recognized in Wein-
garten was seen by Member Penello as a mere extension of a
"previously existing right of an employee to request the pres-
ence of his union representative at a disciplinary interview."4"
43. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1213, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1281.
44. 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 451.
46. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 103 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Dec. 14, 1979).
47. Id. at - 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
48. Id. at 103 L.R.R.M. at 1061 (dissenting opinion of Member Penello; em-
phasis in original).
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The cases that preceded Weingarten appear to support
Member Penello's contention that a right to representation
exists in disciplinary interviews. Member Murphy's proposed
test avoids the need to confront much of the pre-Weingarten
precedent by concluding that, in certain circumstances, no in-
terview has occurred so that representation rights do not
exist.
Two recent decisions have expounded upon the investiga-
tory/disciplinary dichotomy. In Pacific Telegraph and Tele-
phone Co.,49 the Board held that a discussion of the em-
ployee's record, initiated by the employee, after the employer
had fulfilled its purpose of announcing a previously deter-
mined disciplinary penalty, did not trigger Weingarten repre-
sentation rights. In Texaco, Inc., the Board limited Pacific
Telegraph and Telephone Co. by finding representation
rights in a situation "where an employer engages in conduct
that goes beyond that required to inform an employee of a
previously made disciplinary decision . . . ."5 In this case,
the employer had initiated the discussion which was over and
above the announcement of a prior decision.
The disciplinary/investigatory approach or the interview/
disciplinary action approach contains some difficulties. One of
these difficulties is that the Board or court will have to reex-
amine the record of the meeting and determine if the em-
ployer had, in fact, previously made the decision to discipline.
This determination may be very difficult to make in cases
where no specific documentation regarding a prior decision is
available. Another problem which results from these theories
is that the employee is placed in an untenable position. If an
employee is not warned that an interview is not planned, then
he may believe that questioning will be part of the meeting
and he may then believe it proper to request representation.
If the employee makes what seems to be a proper request and
is denied representation, he may decide to avoid the meeting.
The employee should not have to guess if a meeting to which
he is summoned is to be an investigatory interview or a disci-
plinary interview or, in the alternative, an interview or a disci-
plinary action.
49. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 103 L.R.R.M. 1070 (Dec. 14, 1979).
50. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 103 L.R.R.M. 1091, 1092 (Dec. 14, 1979).
1980]
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If no questioning of an employee is performed, it would
appear that the presence of a representative at the meeting
would not be necessary. The representative will certainly not
have the opportunity to help "elicit important facts" during
the meeting. Nevertheless, the difficulties presented by the
theories forwarded by the Board in its attempt to avoid repre-
sentation rights in disciplinary interviews or actions seem to
underscore the need that such exceptions be applied strictly
and that employer-initiated discussion be coupled with a right
to be represented. In order to avoid the difficulties arising
from the Baton Rouge line of cases, the Board may simply
state the issue as the Weingarten Court did: "Is the meeting
one that the employee reasonably believes could result in dis-
cipline?" If this question is answered affirmatively, then the
right to be represented should apply. Granting the right in
cases such as this should not disrupt the meetings in question
since the employer may limit the representative's role at the
meeting.
B. Employee Request of Representation
The Weingarten Court stated that the right of representa-
tion "arises only in situations where the employee requests
representation. ' 51 The requirement that a request by the em-
ployee trigger the right to representation has posed a number
of problems. In Climax Molybdenum Co.,52 two employees
were asked to appear at an investigatory meeting. Both em-
ployees knew of the disciplinary results that reasonably fol-
low, but neither requested union representation. The union
requested that it be permitted to have a pre-interview confer-
ence with the employees. The employer rejected the union's
request. An unfair labor practice was filed by the union. In
this case, the Board found the pre-interview consultation to
be within the right to representation; but more importantly
for our present analysis, the denial of the union's request was
found to be a denial of the employee's right to representa-
tion." The court of appeals denied enforcement, partially on
51. 420 U.S. at 257.
52. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1977). A dissent was filed by members
Penello and Walther that disagreed with both the extension of Weingarten to pre-
interview consultation and permitting a union to make the representation request.
53. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
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the theory that the right to representation only arises "upon
request by the employees.""
The union has an interest in enhancing its effectiveness in
the representation of all employees. This interest is furthered
by observing and participating in the investigatory inter-
view.5 5 The employee's interest is in resolving the matter
under investigation in a favorable manner. While these inter-
ests were considered by the Court in the formulation of the
representation right, it appears that the selection of section 7
as the statutory basis for the right limits use of the right to
circumstances where an individual employee seeks to utilize
his section 7 rights. Weingarten recognized that an employee
"may forego his guaranteed right and, if he prefers, partici-
pate in an interview unaccompanied by his union representa-
tive. '56 The decision to protect oneself through the concerted
action of representation is one that should be made volunta-
rily. The clear language of Weingarten requires that only an
employee request representation. 7
Through collective bargaining, a union may acquire the
right to be present at all investigatory interviews. The Board
has yet to encounter a case where a union has access to inter-
views as a representative through a contractual arrangement
and where the employee refused to allow the union to be pre-
sent as his or her representative. A case such as this would
necessitate the balancing of the union's interest as the exclu-
sive representative of the bargaining unit and its obligations
and rights under the collective bargaining agreement, and the
employee's individual rights under Weingarten and his inter-
est in resolving his disciplinary problems in a private manner.
The Board has held that the viability of the representation
right does not depend upon the existence of a union as a bar-
gaining representative. 8 In Glomac Plastics, Inc.,59 the Board
54. 584 F.2d 360, 363 (10th Cir. 1978).
55. 420 U.S. at 262-63.
56. Id. at 257.
57. See note 31 supra.
58. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 592 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 97 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1978);
Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 430, 99 L.R.R.M. 1622 (1978); Good Samaritan Nurs-
ing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 104 L.R.R.M. 1390 (June 27, 1980).
59. 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 97 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1978).
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held that "[s]ection 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and
are in no wise dependent on union representation for their im-
plementation." 60 In Anchortank, Inc.,6 1 a union election had
been won by the union, but certification had not yet occurred
when a request for representation was made by two employ-
ees. The employer denied the representation request, assert-
ing that no union certification had occurred. The Board stated
that "status of the union as a bargaining representative has no
bearing on the employee's right to have a representative pre-
sent during an investigatory or disciplinary interview. 862 The
Board further stated that the Weingarten Court's:
primary concern was with the right of the employees to have
some measure of protection when faced with a confrontation
with the employer which might result in adverse action
against the employee. These employee concerns remain
whether or not the employees are represented by a union
.... The status of the requested representative, whether it
be that of Union not yet certified or simply that of fellow
employee, does not operate to deprive the employees of their
Section 7 rights."3
The section 7 analysis used in the Weingarten opinion
does not lead to the conclusion that a union may unilaterally
request to be present at an investigatory interview.6 4 In fact,
the existence of a union is wholly irrelevant to the right of
representation. Furthermore, the interests of the union may
be protected by access to the grievance procedure.6 5 Requiring
an employee's request for representation would insure that an
employee voluntarily chooses to have a representative present
at an investigatory interview.
An employer is under no obligation to inform the employee
of his right to representation.6" This fact places the burden of
60. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1443.
61. 239 N.L.R.B. 430, 99 L.R.R.M. 1622 (1978).
62. 239 N.L.R.B. at 430, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1623.
63. Id.
64. See Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CH. L. REV.
331, 348 (1973-74), where by using a combination of section 7 and section 9 in creat-
ing the representation right the commentator concludes that the union may unilater-
ally request to be present. This theory is a pre-Weingarten analysis and may not
survive the purely section 7 analysis by the Court in Weingarten.
65. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
66. Craver, The Inquisatorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L.
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informing the employee of his representation right on the
union. If a union exists, there is a means through which an
employee may be informed and educated regarding his right
to representation. If an employee fails to request a representa-
tive, due to ignorance, his complaint should be directed to his
union.67
If a union does not exist, then the employee must be self-
educated in regards to the representation right. One of the ba-
sic purposes of the representation right is to achieve a balance
of power between employees and employers at investigatory
interviews. If the employee is not aware of his right to repre-
sentation, he or she will not be able to enjoy the protection
which the representation right was intended to provide. The
issue, then, becomes who, if anyone, should have an affirma-
tive duty to inform employees of their rights under Wein-
garten. If an obligation is imposed on some party, then it be-
comes necessary to provide an outline that may be followed in
informing the employee of his rights.
The only apparent way in which an employee at a nonu-
nionized business may be made aware of his right to represen-
tation is through the employer. This practice could be analo-
gous to the criminal procedure requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona, 8 or to the employer's requirement to give certain
warnings in polling or interrogation cases.69
The countervailing interests of the employer and employee
should be considered in determining if a warning requirement
should be imposed on the employer. The employee has an in-
terest in protecting his job security; he is protecting his job
security by having a fellow worker present to assist in and
witness the interview. The employer has an interest in main-
taining productivity and efficiency in the work place; he has
the prerogative of maintaining work rules. The interests of an
employee in having representation, when a union exists, are
promoted by the knowledge that the union representative
usually has regarded the employer's disciplinary procedures. 0
In a nonunion situation, this advantage will probably not be
REV. 1, 22 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Craver].
67. Id.
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1969).
70. 420 U.S. at 262-65.
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present. Because of the probable lack of knowledge by a rep-
resentative regarding disciplinary procedures in a nonunion
work place, he will probably act as a witness rather than as an
active participant in the interview.
A warning requirement should not be adopted by the
Board. Only in a nonunion work place would a warning re-
quirement appear to be necessary; and in such a work place, a
representative's role would be limited. A warning requirement
would necessitate specific rules governing when a warning
should be made and what the warning would consist of. Fur-
thermore, an additional obligation would be imposed on the
employer which would probably lead to complicated rules
which an employer would find difficult to apply in an indus-
trial setting. The complications which a warning requirement
might bring outweigh the need for a warning in nonunion
work places.
C. Effectiveness of the Request
Some difficulties have developed concerning the effective-
ness of a request for representation. This section will summa-
rize some of the cases in this area and provide some practical
suggestions for dealing with request problems.
In Lennox Industries, Inc.,71 an employee was asked by a
supervisor to accompany him to his desk. The employee rea-
sonably feared discipline and, therefore, requested union rep-
resentation. The supervisor did not attempt to eliminate the
reasonable fear of the employee and did not attempt to get a
representative. No further representation request was made,
and the employee was interviewed in a management office.
The Board held that this subsequent interview was in viola-
tion of Weingarten. An employee "who has made a request
for union representation on the plant floor need not repeat
the request at the interview. '7 2 The Board did not rigidly re-
quire a representation request at the location of the interview.
The Lennox case included an additional claim which devel-
oped when an employee, who had earlier appeared before a
supervisor and requested representation, was sent back to
work; later the same day, the employee was told by a supervi-
71. 244 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 102 L.R.R.M. 1298 (Aug. 24, 1979).
72. Id. at -, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1300.
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sor to return to the supervisor's office or he would be in "seri-
ous trouble." The administrative judge found that the order
to go to the supervisor's office was a violation of the em-
ployee's Weingarten rights.73 The Board reversed the admin-
istrative judge and found that it was the employee's duty to
request representation before his interviewer and not before
any other party.7 4 The Board would therefore require a repre-
sentation request in the presence of the actual interviewer.
The dissent by Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins states
that an order, accompanied by a threat to appear for an inter-
view from a supervisor who knows of the employee's request
for representation and does nothing to effectuate that request,
is in violation of section 8(a)(1). 75 The dissent further con-
tended that the subsequent interview was "tainted" by the
representation violation previously incurred. 6
Lennox Industries, Inc. demonstrates that an employee
should, if he is to protect his Weingarten rights, make it clear
to the interviewer that he will not submit to the interview
without representation. This explicit request should be made
even if a request had been made from the shop floor. A lack of
clear communication can result in a loss of the representation
right.
D. Request of a Specific Employee as Representative
The Board, in Roadway Express, Inc.,77 addressed the issue
of an employee request for a specific representative. In this
case, the requested representative was not available at the
time of the interview. The Board stated that "nowhere in
Weingarten does the Court state or suggest that an em-
ployee's interest can only be safeguarded by the presence of a
specific representative .... If the availability of the re-
quested employee is outside of the control of the employer,
and the employee requested is not reasonably available, but
an alternative representative is, a denial of the requested rep-
resentative shall not be a violation of section 8(a)(1).
73. Id. at -, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1301.
74. Id. at -, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1301.
75. Id. at -, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1302 (dissenting opinion).
76. Id. at -, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1302 (dissenting opinion).
77. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 103 L.R.R.M. 1050 (Dec. 14, 1979).
78. Id. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1053.
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In Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,79 the Board held that to require
a three-day postponement of an interview, when an alterna-
tive representative is available, would be unreasonable and
would interfere with the legitimate employer prerogative of
maintaining order and discipline at the work site. The Board
also noted that an employer is not required to offer an alter-
native representative. The burden of informing unit members
of the designation of union officials is one more appropriately
borne by the bargaining unit 0
Unions should attempt to instruct their members regard-
ing the representatives that are available to them. If an em-
ployee requests a specific union representative who is reasona-
bly available, it would appear that the employer would be
required to summon the requested representative. The em-
ployer's prerogative to hold an investigatory meeting without
interruption of production and within a reasonable period
must be weighed against the interest of the employee in hav-
ing a particular representative. The problems associated with
requesting a specific representative should be considered in
light of these conflicting interests.
If a request for representation is made which cannot be
met because a representative is not available, the interview
must be delayed until representation is reasonably available.8 1
This rule appears to best further the policy of Weingarten.
Further problems have developed regarding the represen-
tative who is made available to an employee. For example, in
the absence of a designated union representative, may another
employee be chosen as a representative? In Crown Zellerbach,
Inc.,82 the Board upheld an administrative judge's ruling
which found that the appointment of a fellow union member
satisfied the representation right when a union representative
was not available. The represented employee did not protest
the choosing of another employee (the representative in this
case was apparently actively involved in union affairs and had
an active role in the interview). The administrative law judge
79. 227 N.L.R.B. 1276, 94 L.R.R.M. 1200 (1977).
80. Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1201.
81. Super Valu Xenia, 236 N.L.R.B. 1095, 98 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1978). See also dis-
sent in Roadway Express, 246 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1056 (Dec. 14,
1979).
82. 239 N.L.R.B. 1124, 100 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1978).
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found that the basic reason for the Weingarten rule is to
"preclude management from overpowering 'a lone employee in
a disciplinary meeting.' "83 Therefore, where a union represen-
tative is not available, a request for representation may be ful-
filled by the presence of a fellow union member or perhaps a
fellow employee.8
A limitation appears to exist upon the designation of a
nonunion representative when a union representative is not
available. The validity of the designation is conditioned on
the competence of the employee representative.85 The repre-
sentative, if given the opportunity, should be able to reasona-
bly assist the investigated employee. Requiring the represen-
tative to be competent would serve to protect the interests of
the investigated employee and of all other employees of the
work place.
Another approach would be to require that the designation
by the employer be made in good faith. This lesser standard
would be less burdensome on the employer, but it would not
assure a proper and adequate utilization of the representation
right. The Board should clearly establish a standard of com-
petence for representatives who are neither specifically re-
quested by the employee nor designated by the union. Two
points can be made concerning this issue. First, the employee
involved should immediately make known that he does not ac-
cede to the chosen representative. This can be an embarrass-
ing situation for both the potential representative and for the
employee; but if no objection is made, the Board may find a
waiver to any objection .regarding the representative's compe-
tence. Second, the employer, in order to avoid dealing with
judgments on the competence of the representative, should
postpone the meeting until a union representative, or some
specifically requested representative is available. This precau-
tion could avoid later claims of unfair labor practices.
83. Id. at 1127, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1093.
84. In the Crown case, the judge also discussed the fact that he believed that the
employee had purposefully requested a representative not present in order to avoid
or delay a disciplifiary proceeding. While this was a factor in the decision, it seems
that his arguments regarding the purpose of Weingarten were more at the essence of
the decision.
85. 239 N.L.R.B. 1127, 100 L.R.R.M. 1093 (1978).
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E. Reasonable Belief of Discipline
The Supreme Court in Weingarten held that the right to
representation exists only "where the employee reasonably be-
lieves the investigation will result in disciplinary action."88
The Court sought to establish an objective standard where the
subjective motivations and thoughts of the employee would
not be relevant.8 7 Investigatory interviews that require repre-
sentation were distinguished from "run-of-the-mill shop floor
conversations as, for example, the giving of instructions or
training or needed corrections of work techniques."88
In VanTran Electric Corp.,8 9 the Board summarily af-
firmed an administrative law judge's decision, after reviewing
it in light of Weingarten, which appears to give the reasonable
basis standard a rather broad meaning. The decision states
that the objective standard will be met when the employee
has "some reason to be apprehensive about his job situa-
tion." 90 Another example of a broad reading of the objective
standard may be found in Exxon Co. USA,91 where the Board
again summarily affirmed an administrative law judge's deci-
sion. The administrative judge's decision, in referring to
Weingarten, stated that "the standard enunciated by the
Board is simply one of whether *a reasonable belief exists in
the employee's mind based on some objective evidence, rather
than a mere figment of the employee's imagination.'92 The
approach taken by these decisions indicates that, rather than
considering all the circumstances, the courts will engage in a
search for any basis to support the employee's contention of
reasonable belief.
In contrast to the broader statements regarding the rea-
sonable belief standard, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,9 8 expressed a stricter view
of the Weingarten standard. The court explained that
86. 420 U.S. at 257.
87. Id. at 257 n.5.
88. Id. at 257-58 (quoting Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. at 199, 79 L.R.R.M. at
1271 (1972)).
89. 218 N.L.R.B. 43 (1975).
90. Id. at 45.
91. 223 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976).
92. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
93. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 64:173
INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEWS
"whether an investigatory interview may lead to disciplinary
action is an objective inquiry based upon a reasonable evalua-
tion of all the circumstances, not upon the subjective reaction
of the employee. ' 94 The court followed this statement by find-
ing that a "latent threat" permeates all supervisory interviews
in which the employee is questioned or instructed about work
performance.9 5 Finally, the court stated that the validity of a
representation request depends on whether "a significant
purpose of the interview is to obtain facts to support discipli-
nary action that is probable or that is being seriously consid-
ered."9 The difficulty arising from the test proposed by the
Ninth Circuit is that a subjective inquiry is necessary in order
to determine if a "substantial purpose" of the interview is to
gather facts on which to base discipline. Furthermore, in order
to establish that discipline is being "seriously considered," an-,
other probe into the subjective motivations of the employer
must occur.
In order to remain faithful to the Board's policy of avoid-
ing incursions into the subjective motives and thoughts of
parties, 97 and to fulfill the Weingarten mandate, the courts
and the Board should avoid using language which implies a
standard virtually lacking in substance or one that requires an
analysis of the employer's intention. All of the circumstances
surrounding the meeting should be considered. Past practice
in disciplinary procedure,98 prior history of reprimands of the
employee, 99 location of the interview,100 events just previous to
the conversation,"' and the proposed subject of the interview
if known to the employee 0 2 are all factors of an objective na-
ture and should be considered.
While the above-mentioned factors are helpful to the em-
ployer and employee in assessing the validity of a request for
representation, it appears that the initial conversation of the
94. Id. at 410.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
98. Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 97 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1978).
99. Id. at 1310, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1443.
100. General Elec. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 100 L.R.R.M. 1248, 1250 (Feb. 1,
1979); Exxon Co. USA, 223 N.L.R.B. 203, 91 L.R.R.M. 1591 (1976).
101. Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 94 L.R.R.M. 117 (1977).
102. Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 61, 89 L.R.R.M. 1336 (1975).
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parties can be the crucial factor in establishing the reasona-
bleness of the request. An employee is required to listen to
the employer's statements regarding the purpose of the meet-
ing. 1 03 An employer is wise to instruct his agents to clearly
state to an employee that disciplinary action is not contem-
plated.104 A statement that "you do not need assistance" is
not enough to eliminate an otherwise reasonable apprehension
of disciplinary action. 10 5 But a clear and simple statement
that disciplinary reasons are not the purpose of the meeting
may be enough to initially eliminate the reasonable basis for
the representation request.
The apparent lack of a reason to request a representative
at the initial stage of conversation does not prevent the inter-
view from becoming one where a reasonable fear of discipline
: may develop, and a request may subsequently be appropri-
ate.10 6 In Oil Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB,10 7 two employees
had been in a fight in the work area and had consequently
been suspended. The employees were informed that the pur-
pose of the meeting with management would be merely to re-
instate them. A representation request was properly denied.
The supervisor, after warning that further fighting would not
be tolerated, prevented one employee from leaving by stating:
"No, no, there's something else I have to tell you."' 08 This
statement was found by the court to create a reasonable fear
of discipline. All that would have been necessary to eliminate
this reasonable fear would have been a simple statement that
no discipline was intended at the meeting. The change from
an unprotected employer-employee meeting to a meeting
where representation may be required could have been easily
avoided. 0 9
The use of an objective standard, which considers all the
circumstances, appears to be more useful than a subjective
103. AAA Equip. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 598.F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1979).
104. Amoco Chem. Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 394, 99 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1978).
105. Lennox Indus. Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 102 L.R.R.M. 1298 (Aug. 24, 1979).
106. Oil Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 591.
109. For another example of a "change in character" of an employer-employee
conversation, see AAA Equip. Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 99 L.R.R.M. 1262
(Sept. 26, 1978).
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standard or a rule that requires representation in all em-
ployee-employer contacts.11 0 While a case-by-case determina-
tion of the circumstances may be necessary to apply the objec-
tive standard provided by Weingarten, clear communication
between parties may avoid an unnecessary request for repre-
sentation or an unlawful denial of representation.' Further-
more, in light of the cost, confusion and acrimony that litiga-
tion of a representation case may bring, it may be advisable
for employers to allow representation in questionable cases. 1 2
Since an employer controls the extent of the representative's
participation in the interview, no extreme hardship would fall
upon the employer.
F. The Role of the Representative
1. During the Interview
The Supreme Court in Weingarten was clear in its view
that the employer may control the participation of the repre-
sentative at the investigatory interview.113 While it was sug-
gested that the representative may be of assistance in clarify-
ing the facts or in suggesting other employees who may know
the facts, no mandate was imposed on the employer to bar-
gain with the representative."'
In two recent Board decisions, the role of the representa-
tive and the employer's right to regulate the representative's
role have been discussed. In Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. 115 and Texaco, Inc.,"' the Board has concluded that an
110. Lennox Indus. Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 102 L.R.R.M. 1298 (Aug. 24, 1979);
AAA Equip. Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 99 L.R.R.M. 1262 (Sept. 26, 1978), en-
forcement denied, 598 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1979); Amoco Chem. Corp., 237 N.L.R.B.
394, 99 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1978); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 97 L.R.R.M.
1441 (1978); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 N.L.R.B. 757, 95 L.R.R.M. 1216
(1977), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978); Exxon Co. USA,
223 N.L.R.B. 203, 91 L.R.R.M. 1591 (1976); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 989,
91 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1975); VanTran Elec. Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 43, 89 L.R.R.M. 1336
(1975). For two distinct views on how the objective standard will affect implementa-
tion of Weingarten, see Craver, supra note 66; and, Note, Employee Right to Union
Representation During Employer Interrogation, 7 U. TOL. L. Rav. 298 (1975-76).
111. Note, Employee Right to Union Representation During Employer Interro-
gation, 7 U. TOL. L. Rv. at 319.
112. Craver, supra note 66, at 19-20 n.82.
113. 420 U.S. at 260.
114. Id.
115. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 105 L.R.R.M. 1246 (Oct. 6, 1980).
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employer may not require that a representative remain silent
throughout an investigatory interview. In both cases, the rep-
resentatives were told at the commencement of the meetings
that they were to remain silent throughout the interviews.
The Board concluded that:
the Supreme Court, in the course of its Weingarten deci-
sion, intended to strike a careful balance between the right
of an employer to investigate the conduct of its employes at
a personal interview, and the role to be played by a statu-
tory representative who is present at such an interview. It is
clear from the Supreme Court's decision that the role of the
statutory representative at an investigatory interview is to
provide "assistance" and "counsel" to the employee being
interrogated.117
While "assistance" and "counsel" are to be provided by the
representative, the Board also recognized that the employer
was under no duty to bargain with the representative and that
the interview should not become an "adversary confronta-
tion."' '118 Therefore, the Board found that an employer may
control the role of the representative in a reasonable manner
to prevent bargaining or an adversary confrontation with the
representative.
The effect of these Board decisions is to eliminate the view
of the representative as a "passive observer." 119 A representa-
tive will now have the right to participate in the interview
even where an employer may not desire such participation.
The difficulty that now arises is what standard the Board will
adopt to determine if a representative is engaging in bargain-
ing or when the representative is changing the nature of the
interview to an adversary confrontation.
The courts of appeals have yet to confront the issue
presented by these recent Board decisions. The courts have
not been receptive to expansions or liberal interpretations of
the Weingarten decision as evidenced by the rejection of the
right to pre-interview consultation.1 20 The Weingarten deci-
116. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 105 L.R.R.M. 1239 (Oct. 6, 1980).
117. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1247.
118. Id.
119. Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1243.
120. See text accompanying notes 122-24, infra.
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sion may be read to preclude an active role for a representa-
tive if an employer so wishes. The Board has attempted to
balance the interests discussed in Weingarten in delineating
the role of the representative. It is now necessary to see how
the courts of appeals will perform the balancing act.
An employer, if he is truly in search of fairness for his em-
ployee, will permit the representative to actively participate in
a constructive manner. This may assist the employer because
a decision to discipline, made after active participation by the
representative, may strengthen the employer's position at the
grievance stage12 1 and convince the union of the meritless na-
ture of the grievance.
2. Before the Interview
While the representative's role during the interview was
clearly delineated in Weingarten, pre-interview intervention
by a representative was not addressed. The Board and the
courts have disagreed on the pre-interview role of a represen-
tative. In Climax Molybdenum Co., the Board upheld the de-
cision of an administrative law judge that found an unfair la-
bor practice in a denial by an employer to permit pre-
interview consultation between an employee and his represen-
tative.122 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforce-
ment, contending that pre-interview consultation was an un-
warranted expansion of Weingarten.1 2' The court held that a
refusal to permit an employee to consult with his representa-
tive before an investigative interview was not an unfair prac-
tice.124 While the court of appeals denied the right to pre-in-
terview consultation on company time, it did state that
Weingarten "requires that the employer set investigatory in-
terviews at such a future time and place that the employee
will be provided the opportunity to consult with his represen-
tative in advance thereof on his own time.1 25 No elaboration
was made on this seemingly crucial statement, which actually
121. For disadvantages of representaton, see Brodie, Union Representation and
the Disciplinary Interview, 15 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1973) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Brodie).
122. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1977).
123. 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
124. Id. at 363.
125. Id. at 365.
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imposes an added obligation on the employer. The employer
must provide a reasonable time and place of interview, so that
the employee may have representation available, and must
consider the availability of a pre-interview consultation.
A representative who is well-prepared before the interview
by consulting with his fellow employees would be able to ac-
complish the tasks of protecting the employee and of present-
ing the facts as clearly as possible to the employer. Further-
more, a pre-interview consultation followed by an interview
with representation may be enough to deter any further ac-
tion on the part of the employee in a meritless case. This last
effect would be advantageous to both unions and employers. 26
Weingarten does not provide for a pre-interview consulta-
tion. The function of an interview consultation would be to
familiarize the representative with the facts of the particular
case. The representative's role as contemplated by Wein-
garten could be performed by one who is familiar with the
general disciplinary procedures of the employer. Weingarten
did not require the representative to be familiar with the facts
of the particular case. 127 Nevertheless, a pre-interview consul-
tation may be necessary to permit the representative to effec-
tively "counsel" the employer.
3. Union Right to Bargain Away Representation Rights
Another issue which involves the union's role in represen-
tation is whether the imion may waive the individual em-
ployee's right to representation by the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. There have been no post-Weingarten
cases which have directly addressed this issue.128 In New York
Telephone Co.,1 29 the Board reviewed a case where the right
to representation was considered dependent upon whether the
union had waived the representation right through collective
bargaining. While an implication from this case may be drawn
that if the union had bargained away the employee's rights
126. See Brodie, supra note 121, at 13-14.
127. 420 U.S. at 262-63.
128. In a pre-Weingarten case, the Board found that a union may negotiate away
the right to representation at an investigatory interview. Western Elec. Co., 198
N.L.R.B. 623, 80 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1972). No post-Weingarten cases have directly ad-
dressed this issue.
129. 219 N.L.R.B. 679, 89 L.R.R.M. 1723 (1975).
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the representation right would effectively be waived, it does
not appear that such an implication is proper. Early in its
opinion, the Board in New York Telephone stated that the
administrative law judge's analysis of the case and their own
did not pass on the question of whether an employee's right to
representation may be waived.130
A union may bargain away some statutory rights of em-
ployees. 1 In assessing if a union can waive an employee's
statutory right under section 7, the Supreme Court has at-
tempted to weigh the interests of the parties involved and the
consistency of the waiver with national labor policy.132 Where
a union waives the right to representation, the employee is
left without the protection of concerted action at an investiga-
tory interview. The union may feel that it can gain in other
areas by negotiating away the right to representation. Unlike
the waiver of the right to strike where the interests of the em-
ployer, employees, union and the general public are protected,
a waiver of the right to representation leaves the employee
totally without protection at the investigatory interview. In
view of the balance of interests involved and the policy which
Weingarten articulated, it would appear that thie representa-
tion right is not waivable by the union. The Board and courts
will have to give further guidance on this point.
A waiver of a right protected by section 7 must be clear
and unmistakable.133 If the Board and courts ultimately find
the right to representation waivable, such waiver should only
be allowed in circumstances where the waiver is clear and
explicit.
G. The Employer's Prerogatives and Obligations
Weingarten provided that the representation right should
not interfere with certain legitimate employer prerogatives.13 4
The Court stated that the employer preserved the prerogative
to carry out an investigation without an interview with the
employee. This, the Court found, would best balance the em-
ployer's and the employee's interests. Three choices are avail-
130. Id. at 679 n.7, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1724 n.7.
131. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (right to strike).
132. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 332 (1974).
133. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
134. 420 U.S. at 258.
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able to an employer upon a valid employee request for repre-
sentation: "(1) grant the request; (2) discontinue the inter-
view; [or] (3) offer the employee the choice between continu-
ing the interview unaccompanied by a union representative, or
have no interview at all.' '135 The employer may not proceed
with the interview without fulfilling a valid request "unless
the employee voluntarily agrees to remain unrepresented, af-
ter having been offered the choices mentioned in option 3
above, or if the employee is otherwise aware of those
choices."" 6
An employer has the prerogative of maintaining order in
the line of production. In Roadway Express, Inc.,13 7 the Board
recognized the interest which an employer has in ordering a
disruptive employee to leave the production area and report
to a supervisor's office. Once this order is given, an employee
must obey. Refusal to appear at the office until representation
appears may be grounds for a dismissal for disobedience.138
The Board, in analyzing the facts of the case, discussed the
concept of a "pre-interview discussion in the office." 1 9 The
"pre-interview" period consists of an interchange in which the
employee is not yet subject to direct questioning nor is asked
to speak about the disciplinary situation. During the "pre-in-
terview" period, the employee must comply with the order to
appear at the office. The Board attempted to limit the effect
of this holding by stating that "an employee's Weingarten
rights, with all its attendant safeguards, matures at the com-
mencement of the interview, be it on the production floor or
in a supervisor's office." 140 While it appears clear that the em-
ployer has an interest in maintaining order at the production
line, it is totally unnecessary to add a "pre-interview discus-
sion" to this already confusing area.
Once an order to appear at a supervisor's office is given
(and if the circumstances merit a reasonable belief that disci-
pline may follow), there should be immediate grounds for a
135. U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 100 L.R.R.M. 1520, 1521 (Mar. 19,
1979).
136. Id. at 1521 (emphasis in original).
137. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 103 L.R.R.M. 1050 (1979).
138. Id. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
139. Id. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1051.
140. Id. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1052.
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valid representation request. The employee should be re-
quired to appear at the office, but once at the office the right
of representation should immediately be addressed. If the em-
ployee is not certain that the interviewer is aware of his or her
prior request, another request should be made. The employer
should then have the burden of choosing which available op-
tion will be exercised. Disobeying an order may interfere with
the employee's right to representation. Therefore, employees,
in order to protect their rights, should follow the order; but
they should make clear that they refuse to participate in any
dialogue without representation. This approach balances the
employer's interests in maintaining order on his production
floor and the employee's interest in representation.
H. Remedies For Violations of Weingarten Rights
Once an employer is found to have violated the Wein-
garten rights of an employee, it becomes necessary to deter-
mine the appropriate remedy for the employer's conduct. The
Board seems to agree on a basic analytical outline for deter-
mining the appropriate remedy:
Initially we determine whether the General Counsel has
made a prima facie showing that a make-whole remedy such
as reinstatement, back pay, and, expungement of all discipli-
nary records is warranted. The General Counsel can make
this showing by proving that respondent conducted an in-
vestigatory interview in violation of Weingarten and that the
employee whose rights were violated was subsequently disci-
plined for the conduct which was the subject of the unlawful
interview.
In the face of such a showing, the burden shifts to the
respondent .... The respondent must demonstrate that its
decision to discipline ... was not based on information ob-
tained at the unlawful interview. Where the respondent
meets its burden, a make-whole remedy will not be
ordered.1 41
While the Board members agree on this general outline,
they consistently disagree on the applicaton of the test. In
each of three recent cases dealing with the issue of an appro-
priate remedy, there has been at least a concurring opinion, if
141. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1233.
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not a dissent. Member Truesdale has expressed the belief that
the majority of the Board has been applying a per se rule
which permits make-whole remedies, rather than a cease and
desist order, in all cases where an employee's Weingarten
rights have been violated.142 In turn, Member Truesdale pro-
poses that each case be studied in order to determine if, in
fact, the respondent has relied on the information gathered in
the interview in reaching its decision to discipline. 143
Member Jenkins has clearly identified himself as one who
believes that "once an employer has disciplined an employee
for conduct which was the subject of an interview conducted
in violation of Weingarten, it becomes virtually impossible to
determine whether the disciplinary decision was based upon
'information' obtained at the unlawful interview.' 1 44 Member
Jenkins continued his analysis by stating that "the only situa-
tion I can conceive where the employer could prove that it did
not rely on 'information' obtained at the unlawful interview in
making the disciplinary decision is when a final . . . decision
to impose discipline was made prior to the interview .... ,,145
The debate existing between the members of the Board
may result in a future adoption of a per se rule, the continued
application of a heavy burden on the employer to show an in-
dependent source for its disciplinary decision or the flexible
application of the standard which would allow employers the
opportunity to show an independent source for its disciplinary
decision. The adoption of a per se rule may be precluded, re-
garding employee reinstatement, by section 10(c) of the Act,
since the section provides that "[n]o order of the Board shall
require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee
who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him
of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or dis-
charged for cause. "14 6 Furthermore, the Board majority, in
Kraft Foods, Inc., expressed its unwillingness to adopt a per
142. Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 105 L.R.R.M. 1239 (Oct. 6, 1980) (Trues-
dale dissenting).
143. Id. at -, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1235.
144. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1234 (Jenkins
dissenting).
145. Id. at -, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1235.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
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se rule on the remedy issue.147 Nevertheless, the Board may,
in fact, adopt a per se rule by ascribing to the beliefs ex-
pressed by Member Jenkins or by making proof of an inde-
pendent source by an employer -an impossible evidentiary
task.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right to representation is now firmly entrenched in la-
bor relations law, but the development of the right and its
parameters is still in question. As the Board is able to address
the many factual circumstances that may fall within the rep-
resentation right, further clarity should result. As Professor
Brodie noted in a pre-Weingarten article: "[t]hose who rely
on the Section 7 analysis are left with the difficult, but not
impossible, task of deciding each case of denial on its particu-
lar circumstances, gradually establishing landmarks which will
guide the employer, the employee, and the union. '1 4
A proper analysis of representation right problems will in-
volve a balancing of interests between the employer, the em-
ployee and the union. The necessity of maintaining a smooth
continuing relationship between these parties must be recog-
nized. The right should be shaped in a manner which does not
overburden the employer with technical difficulties and which,
at the same time, does protect the employee in an investiga-
tory interview.
Jost A. OLIVIERI
147. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1233 n.2.
148. Brodie, supra note 121, at 30.
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